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WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS

W. TUDOR JONES



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

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FOREWORD

THIS small Book deals with a great subject, and its appearance could not be justified if it pretended to handle all the aspects of the subject. Its aim is to serve as an introduction to some of the leading questions concerning the universe and life.

My extensive and varied experiences during the past seven years, in various parts of the country, have convinced me of a growing desire amongst large numbers of people (young and old) to know something of the scientific and philosophical interpretation of the great problems of life and the universe. If the little volume serves to meet this desire I shall feel greatly rewarded.

I wish to thank my friend, Mr. J. T. Walley, M.A., late Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, for reading the MS. and making several valuable suggestions.

W. TUDOR JONES.

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CONTENTS

CHAP.		PAGE
	FOREWORD	v
I.	THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY . . .	9
II.	KNOWING AND ITS FORMS	19
III.	SOME PROBLEMS OF ORIGINS	37
IV.	SOME PROBLEMS OF MIND	51
V.	SOME PROBLEMS OF VALUES	61

WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS

CHAPTER I

THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY

THE main object of Philosophy may be designated as an attempt to obtain a view of the universe and of life more comprehensive than the ordinary naïve view. The naïve view of the universe and life in the past and the present has been, on the whole, satisfied with things as they are, and with concluding that the most real object of knowledge consists in knowing, through the avenues of the various senses, the objects which surround us in the external world. On the whole, the naïve view pays attention to objects in the external world for the immediate, practical purposes of life. If these purposes are sufficiently satisfied there is but little further desire to know anything more about the object or objects. The animal is able to accomplish much in the same direction as the naïve mind. It is able to find its food if food is in existence; and this search often shows

a great deal of ingenuity. For example, mice will burrow holes through mortar and wood in order to procure food for themselves and their young. Bees wander and return to their own hive. Throughout nature we discover remarkable movements and appliances in plants and varied instincts in animals to satisfy their needs. Even on this level, especially as far as animals are concerned, we are obliged to conclude that there is present some amount of knowledge. The energy displayed, the difficulties overcome, and the reaching of the end in view are all evidences of a movement starting with a need and ending with the possession of the object which satisfies the need.

We see here that at the back of the senses there is present in almost every living creature some force, generally termed instinct, which enables the creature to reach its goal within the compass of its needs. This kind of instinct is also still present in man. In human beings, where cultivation of intelligence outside the immediate needs of such forces as hunger and sex has developed but little we find certain important knowledge which is prior to intelligence. Physical energy and dexterity are to be witnessed, and these enable the being to discover and utilise the object which will satisfy a physical need of the animal or the human organism. But needs beyond the most powerful physical ones are often entirely absent. In all human beings these latter needs cannot be entirely absent. But the power of such

needs as hunger and passion is often so strong and persistent as to eclipse almost altogether all other needs.

What are these other needs? Doubtless they too have their origin in some vague satisfaction which an object has brought to a subject. This may often mean no more than an after-effect of a neural impression made on the animal or on the naïve human being. This impression remains when the object which aroused it is no longer present, and this fact, in the case of man at least, forms the nucleus of material which he can utilise in further quests for the satisfaction of his needs from the lowest to the highest levels of his life. Man is able, in a word, to *think* his experiences of the past. The actual satisfaction obtained from a good meal happened in a particular place and at a particular time. The response of the organism in a fainter kind of way revives the presence of that great meal, and for a long time the meal may be a possession of the memory even when the participator is not conscious of the "watering of his mouth" or of any other physical impression. In this final form of the memory of the meal it is not only the food that was partaken of and enjoyed that is present. The time, the place, the surroundings, the subsidiary enjoyments, the persons present, and many other elements are present in the memory. This level of unifying the various elements into a memory of that meal is a possession of the naïve mind. This second meal is

really now more of a mental than of a physical meal. And this proves to us that even the contact of a physical object which satisfied physical human needs leaves behind itself a conscious or mental result. In our consciousness of any event something quite other than the various physical factors of the event are present. We are now able to *think* the event even after the lapse of years.

In this example we get a clue to the meaning of Philosophy. It is an attempt to rediscover in terms of thought the various impressions which are made upon us by objects in the external world—objects which affect us in all kinds of ways. Some of these impressions pertain to wants of our lower nature; others to wants which are higher in their nature. It has already been noticed that in some mysterious way the objects have ceased to be physical. They were once physical, but in order to gain a kind of permanency in life they had to become mental. And we can use this mental element as a kind of Standard or "measuring rod" for future events. And the nature of these future events (whether they are physical or mental) has to be read in the light of this Standard. There is thus something growing within us which is greater and more comprehensive than any particular event, and which explains every particular event. We are able to prepare for future events, to plan them, to modify them, and to expand them by means of this growing experience of past events.

Philosophy then means a love for this wisdom

which enables us to remain the possessors of the meaning of the events of our lives in the form of thoughts. It is a mistake to think that it deals with things which are beyond this world of space and time. It has its origin in the world of space and time, and by means of objects in the external world man gives a meaning to these objects. Now, the naïve mind turns its attention almost exclusively to the objects in the external world and to the pleasure or the pain which these objects bring upon the subject. The lover of wisdom also turns his attention to the objects, but he, in turn, turns his attention further into his own mind. He questions the meaning, the value, and the significance which these objects have for him as a being who is mental as well as physical.

Philosophy is thus a reflection on the meaning of the objects which present themselves to us. We form views in connection with the objects. And we go farther: we are able to connect various objects together—objects which were not perceived together at the same instant in our experience—and to give a meaning to this connection. We are able still further to view certain aspects of objects, and not the whole of them, and give a meaning to these aspects. And, finally we are able to see the value and trend of these ideas concerning objects, and thus construct for ourselves mental and spiritual objects which might have had their origin in simple events but which have as their culmination, brought about by the human

mind, the highest ideals which can be presented to the mind of man.

It will thus be seen that it is possible for man to obtain an ever more comprehensive interpretation of the universe and of life than can happen if no effort is made to step beyond the level of the senses. We have to pass from the conclusions of the senses to the reflective power of the mind, and this process is never to come to an end. Everything that is good and true and noble in the world to-day has been brought about by observation of objects in the world without, combined with an ever greater reflection of mind upon what is observed. There is no other way by which the universe and life can become more and more intelligible to man.

When we pass from the insufficiency of the conclusions of the naïve mind to the conclusions of the past regarding the universe and life we find our selves in a similar position. The results of the past in many directions are remarkable for the penetrating interpretations which they put forth. The philosophies of Greece and Rome, to mention no others, have made contributions which have been and still are of incalculable service to mankind. The works of Plato and Aristotle, for example, have thrown such light on some of the dark places of human life and existence that they cannot be discarded. It is well that the history of problems pertaining to the universe and life should be known. It is true that we can possess no more than a lop-sided view of what

any problem means in the present unless we know how it has come to mean this through its history. This is true concerning everything which is offered as an interpretation of the world or of man. The efforts of the past (as of the present) deal in a large measure with matters of *fact* and matters of *speculation*. It is easier for us to perceive the need of changes in matters of fact than in matters of speculation. Science and Philosophy have been ready on the whole to revise our knowledge concerning matters of fact, *i.e.* concerning the nature and behaviour of objects in the external world. More accurate observation and experiment have helped to bring about such changes. With matters of *speculation* it is more difficult to do this. Matters of speculation have often no bottom to stand upon in the physical world; they are often entirely pictures of the imagination of man—pictures which have but the slightest relationship with the material course of the objects of the world or with the workings of the mind upon objects in the external world. It is evident to all who have eyes to see that speculative elements constructed upon slender analogical foundations cannot possess the strength of conclusions framed by means of observation, experiment, hypothesis, and verification. This is the reason that science and the practical side of philosophy have progressed at a more rapid rate than speculative metaphysics and theology. The former have their theories, but their theories have come into existence by a careful examination of the

facts, and in turn these facts were worked into coherent systems by the human mind. Such systems have always a kind of "touchstone" in the material which they handle. But with speculative ideas the supposed "touchstone" is farther off than the ideas —it is in a realm of greater obscurity, and it is often impossible to test if it exists at all. The result of all this is that speculative ideas have a tendency to be accepted "ready-made," without any intellectual effort worthy of the name. Thus the world to-day is filled with speculative ideas which have cost nothing more than a mere assent to those who hold them. Such ideas may have involved a great deal of labour to their authors. The many who accept them are generally strangers to the travail that was endured by their authors. There can be no other result than that two very different views of the universe and life are at work in the world. The speculative view deals with the highest aspects of life—with man's origin and destiny — but it hardly ever explains, and certainly never attempts to prove the opinions it holds. This kind of view leaves the natural scientific explanation of the universe and of life on one side and looks upon it often as unworthy of consideration. Had it not been that throughout the ages few people have made the attempt to deal with all problems from the side nearest to their hands there could not have arisen any genuine increase of a clearer interpretation of the universe and life.

Science and Philosophy at the present day begin

with all problems from the smaller, nearer ends. They do not finish where they begin, but they must begin here with what is tangible to one or more of the senses. Philosophy then though idealistic and even religious in its later stages is obliged to be practical and empirical at the same time. We shall return to this matter at a later stage in our investigation. It is touched on here in order to show that we need not attempt to fly to some other world to get sufficient answers for the explanation of things. If Philosophy on one side has such a humble origin, it rises, in the course of its unfolding in every human mind, above the level of its birth. In its development in the mind of man it enables him to read the meaning and value of his own life in relation to the universe from all possible sides; it enables him to scale heights of mind within a world which is other than the natural one. But it is through climbing to the interpretation of the natural world and the natural life that he finds a pathway to the peaks of the mental and spiritual world to which it is his privilege to ascend.

This is the message for our day, for it is a message which can transform human life and make it cultural, moral, and divine. Knowledge is the gate which leads to treasures unobtainable in any other way. Knowledge is the only power which, in the last resort, leads to what is tangible, undeniable, and ever valid. And knowledge as its experience increases transmutes its material into fulness, richness,

and depth of life, far beyond what appeared to be possible in the beginning of the quest.

This is the reason that the plea is made for the place of Philosophy in Life.

CHAPTER II

KNOWING AND ITS FORMS

It has to be borne in mind that Philosophy has two sides—the Theoretical and the Practical. The Theoretical side deals with questions of knowledge. This knowledge deals with all things in the universe (thus including life) in so far as these can be known at all. The main object of knowledge is to discover what is termed Reality. We are face to face with innumerable objects which surround us. In connection with many of these we know *that* they are long before we know *what* they are. These are not objects we merely imagine to exist; we are certain that they do exist. They are actually in the world around us. We observe them as existing and possessing various kinds of effects on one another and on ourselves. We distinguish such objects from objects which we imagine or dream about. Such objects, possessing as they do for us, existence, are termed real. Some thinkers of the past and the present have been of opinion that such objects have their reality independently of man perceiving them. Such a theory is termed *Realism*.

Other thinkers believe that Reality is made evident to us by means of consciousness. This latter theory is termed *Idealism*. The truth seems to lie in some kind of union between the object and the consciousness which becomes aware of it. This was Kant's point of view, and, on the whole, it has never been proved to be false. Reality has then two sides or aspects: it has objects in the external world and it has a subject which perceives these objects. We shall see at a later stage that Reality comes to include very much more than this. It comes to include our conceptions or ideas not only with regard to the *existence* of objects in the world outside, but also with regard to the meaning, value, and significance of such objects. We are obliged to come to the conclusion then that man, living as he does surrounded by objects in the external world, creates a second kind of world in a form, as has just been stated, of meaning, value, and significance. The object which he observes comes to stand for him for something permanent, and as he cannot possibly have many of the objects which he observes remaining constantly with him, he has to be satisfied with the object as it is now in the mind. In this way the permanency of the object is established for him. He is not now obliged to perceive it in order to know that it is in existence: the existence of the object is now fixed in his mind in the form of *meaning*. It is true that an object may pass out of its present existence without the subject being aware of the fact. The

tree he was examining in the forest may have by this time been cut down and used for the construction of a boat. In such instances re-verification by means of perception can easily take place. And such re-verification is often necessary. But the most important objects remain in the universe. The earth, sun, moon, stars, and the atmosphere remain. Qualities in them have been perceived and carefully noted. These qualities have become the possession of mind in the form of meaning. And man holds this world of meaning before himself whenever he wishes to think of things or to find an explanation of any event which comes before him.

In the *meaning* of the objects he has examined, the individual makes a further discovery concerning things. He now sees not only what things are but what they are for him and for other human beings. Man is a creature of various needs—physical, mental, moral and religious. He observes at this stage that some objects are helpful for the body, others for the other aspects of his life. And that is what we mean by value. Things can be turned to use. Some things can be made subservient to the sustenance and convenience of the physical life; some things furnish us with ideas by means of which we are able to explain portions of the universe and of life. In this manner men are able to attain to certain ideas in connection with the nature and behaviour of a number of things together. We bind together a bundle of facts with one idea, an idea which ex-

plains something important concerning each member of the bundle. This is a great saving of time and thought. When our increased knowledge of each individual thing in a bundle enables us finally to think of the bundle as a whole, we are able to economise thought and express something of the nature of each member of the bundle in certain important respects. This result is designated as *truth*. It is well to bear in mind that only certain aspects of each member of the bundle may be taken into consideration. By what is termed a process of *abstraction* certain qualities only of all the objects are taken into account, and in so far as *these* qualities are concerned there is agreement between every member of the group of facts we are examining. What is the result of such a procedure as this? It is nothing less than that the observer is able to view a *patch* of the universe and life, whilst otherwise he could view nothing more than individual things in their isolation. Science and philosophy deal, it is true, with actual objects, but they pass from this level to deal with the *relations* of objects to one another. As already stated, a whole patch, small or great, is now viewed. Various patches are further viewed, and patches are brought together by the mind precisely in the same manner as the individual facts were brought together. Thus, man is enabled to think ever larger portions of the universe and life under more and more comprehensive ideas. This aspect of truth has worth or value for man. He finds that many objects have to

bend before the pressure of mind and to yield more and more of the meaning of their place in the world. The same holds true in connection with the moral and religious sides of man's nature, as we shall see later on.

Besides the meaning and value which objects come to have for man in the form of a *togetherness* they also *signify* the path which man has still farther to travel. *Significance* means something like the light of a lantern on a dark night. The lantern shows us enough of the road to find it and to keep us from perilous places. We are not carried beyond the road by the meaning, value, and significance of the world or of life. But in man's nature, if it is exercised, there are potentialities of passing on from stage to stage—of creating ever bigger patches of the universe and life in the form of ideas, of learning how to bring his life into accord with these ideas, and of convincing himself that meaning and value need never come to a terminus but can pass on to an ever greater realisation.

We thus see that although we are able to perceive *reality* without a greater effort than the use of one or more of the senses, yet when the attention of the mind is brought to bear upon certain aspects of several objects we can discern a relation between these aspects. The relation is then expressed in the form of a *concept* or *idea.* It is evident that the concept could not be formed without material from the external world; it is also evident that such material

would remain forever a mere isolated thing without the working of mind upon it. The material itself, as it is perceived by the senses, constitutes one corner-stone which forms one basis of *knowledge;* the work of the mind upon the material constitutes the other corner-stone. Things outside us yield us no more than a naïve view of what they are unless mental effort is brought to bear upon them. The things, after mind has worked upon them, come to *mean* more than they *seem.* We are obliged to attribute to things a certain kind of reality because our consciousness convinces us that they exist outside us. As already hinted, the *existential* or *empirical* side of any thing enables us to know a little concerning *what* the thing is. The effort of mind enables us to tell much more what the thing is. By means of the *reflection* which follows *observation* we are able to frame certain explanations of the thing we are examining, see in it aspects similar to those found in other things. The mind actually *selects* certain elements in things and retains them for the examination of things in the future. Some *principle* is discovered which holds true of a number of things. This principle is designated as a *Law.* The Law has been discovered by an examination of things and of things in their *relations.* We find that such principle or law holds true, and use it in observing and describing and explaining similar things in the future. The principle, or law, is bound to be conceived by us as a reality—a reality of a higher or more comprehensive

nature than the objects we are examining. The facts of the world outside us and the work of the mind upon the facts have led us to the formation of such principles and laws. We cannot throw these away, and we cannot look upon them as illusions. Facts and mind then have led us to a reality which may be termed *metaphysical*. This term metaphysical must not be looked upon as a knowledge of things given to man in some way other than the way of all other knowledge. We have been led to this metaphysical reality by virtue of the meaning which external things in their relations possess for a reflective mind.

Of course the facts of external things do seem to the naïve mind to possess an individuality of their own, and the connection or relation of one fact to another is left out of account. The increasing reflective power of mind discovers this connection and expresses it, as already said, in the form of *concepts*. The result of this is that the isolation disappears in a large measure, and things are seen in their relations. Indeed, nothing of value can be stated about any single thing in the universe except in its connections or relations to some other things. And the relations of many things can often be brought under the head of one concept. A simplification of a slab of the universe is rendered possible in this way, and this results in great *economy of thought*. The details of the facts had to be taken into account: they can now (at least many of them) be dropped out of

account because they are included in the general concept which has been found concerning them. And further, slabs, in their turn, can be treated as individual objects, and they, too, can be brought under a still more general concept. The human mind can proceed in this way indefinitely until it approaches to the point of thinking what the universe and life are *absolutely*. How this work proceeds, and the domains of the universe and of life which are taken into account will be shown at a later stage of our investigation.

We see at once that the universe and mind are not aliens to each other. Without the objects we could not work; without the mind we could not work. Objects and mind are needed in our knowledge of the world and of life. The objects are often *physical* in their nature: they occupy space. The mind which knows the objects is indissolubly connected with the physical. Elementary physiology and psychology prove this. But physiology and psychology have never been able to show that mind and its object (the body) are the same. We stand here before a problem which has baffled the great minds of the ages, and is still baffling some of the greatest minds of our day. In the long history of the enquiry concerning the relation of mind and body no one has ever succeeded in demonstrating that the former may be reduced to terms of the latter. Certainly more and more intimate connections between the two are constantly brought to light, but they still remain connections and

nothing more. The stress, on the whole, in modern times, up to the present has been to emphasise the *physical* side of mind and mind's dependence upon body. In the newer Psychology, in the forms it is taking in Psycho-analysis and Psycho-therapeutics, the emphasis is being laid on the mental side. Even starting on the level of Biology, we find that Life and Matter, most intimately interwoven as they are, do not mean the same thing, at least by those biologists who have acquaintance with some of the main principles of Psychology. Connected as closely as they are, the physical world and consciousness are two different things. The relation of the two has certainly to be emphasized, and this emphasis is being made by various branches of natural science. But, on the other side, the *difference* between the two has to be emphasized quite as much. When the *relation* alone is emphasized mind is dragged down to the level of a *thing*—a mere object in the external world. It is not likely that mind can gain confidence in its own power on this path. It has already been pointed out that in the actual formation of concepts mind was creating a higher grade of reality than was possible at the mere perceptual level. Without the creation of such ever higher and more comprehensive grades of reality no meaning could have been given to the world and life; no value could have been attached to the innumerable things which are presented to us; we should not know what to select and what to reject; and there would be no possibility of using present knowledge for

future purposes. We should have to take each succeeding moment as it arrives without being able to use past and present experiences for its interpretation.

The work of Natural Science is confined to objects in the external world, and one of its special functions is to express aspects of such objects in a *quantitative way*. The relation of mind to its physical vehicle is bound to be emphasized, measured, and weighed, on the physical side. Probably it is not the business of the scientist to do more than this. To deal with the *psychical* side is left for the psychologist. The psychologist, in his turn, does not by any means exhaust the contents of mind. His main object is to deal with the relationship of body and mind and to point out the manner in which mental processes have developed from simple to more complex forms. Much of the work done in this direction deals with the physical aspect of things; much of it also deals with the psychical aspect. The psychological work shows how such mental aspects as concepts are formed, but it is not its business to deal with the difference between true and false concepts. It deals with mind from all possible sides which cast light over the growth of mind. Healthy and morbid phenomena are both of use to psychology: it is as interested in one as in the other. But it is clear that it would never do to allow all the various growths of the mind to be cultivated with care. We find that certain of these growths are injurious to the individual and to society. Indeed, it

is abundantly clear that it is on account of many of these morbid growths that the ills which are in the world to-day have had their existence. Psychology then passes on the question of what should be *selected* and what *rejected* to the remaining mental sciences. We shall see later how these remaining sciences take up the question and show what the *worths* or *values* of things are. Had it not been for the presence of such mental sciences there would be no justification for emphasizing some things more than others; there would have been no process of selection whatever possible. Man would flounder in darkness, entirely at the mercy of anything which might crop up from moment to moment. In such a state as this nothing would be possible but a chaos of impulses and low interests, and there would be no Standard to measure the different worths or values of the things which present themselves to the individual from his own mind or from the outside.

Philosophy, then, emphasizes the *mental* aspect of life. It perceives the limitations of natural science and psychology, with regard to the life of the individual and of the race. Philosophy does take into account the need of emphasizing the *quantitative* side of things. Much has been gained in the past by such emphasis. The results of the natural sciences and psychology have to be taken into account. They cast a great deal of light on the physical side of life and of the relation of this side to the universe. But we are obliged to go farther than this. The mental

life of man has gained a certain *autonomy* concerning the meanings and values of concepts which have unfolded in consciousness. Such concepts have certainly a partially physical and a partially psychical origin. In the course of their development such concepts have come to form the meaning of the universe and of life, and it is in this sense that they may be termed autonomous. However much mystery there may yet remain concerning the complete origin of mind, and much mystery does remain, still if we are to construct any meaning out of the universe and life the most comprehensive concepts have to be taken into account and granted a validity which is beyond dispute. Philosophy then does not ignore the physical side of a man's nature, but it is attempting once again to-day to shift a little the centre of gravity to sides of human nature other than the physical side. Mind is now seen to be not only an energy of matter but an energy of life and a vehicle of consciousness.

The mind of man, whether conscious or unconscious of what it was doing, has been led to form conceptual ideas concerning life and the universe. These conceptional notions have taken various forms in the history of human thought. They may be summed up, in the main, under the following heads: materialism, intellectualism, voluntarism, emotionalism, and idealism. In turn these conceptions have given origin to various sub-conceptions. The reason, or one of the main reasons, for such varied views of the universe and life is due to the fact that the

material of the physical and the mental worlds is so vast that no single mind is able to do exact work in all parts of it. Thus we find men who have been working in a physical corner of the field apt to take up the work from the physical standpoint, and thus express the meaning of the world and life in terms of matter. Many of these look upon mind as merely the flowering of a material product. Although mind has to be recognised in the construction of such a materialistic theory it is in a very large measure ignored and is not conceived as being partly *self-subsistent*. The limitation of such a theory is not due to its falsity but to its one-sidedness. It is of great value when it is taken as a *partial* view of things, but it is false when it is taken as a complete view of the universe and life. The naturalist when he becomes a philosopher is only too ready to state that the material results found in his corner of the field apply to all portions of the field. Such a conclusion is based upon no more than analogy and imagination. It is no wonder that one of our foremost living thinkers stated that Herbert Spencer was greater as a poet than as a philosopher.

What is stated here as a grave limitation of the materialistic conclusions is not always confined to that realm but is apt to find its way into all the remaining theories, esecially if they are viewed by their authors as *closed* and not *open systems*.

Intellectualism is a view of the universe and life from the standpoint of the meaning and value of the

concept. The stress in such a system is laid upon *meaning*. This is correct. Man creates meanings and values for the things which are presented to him. Life and the universe are explained in such terms. The conclusion of Intellectualism is that the universe and life *mean* what is impressed upon the mind after long reflection upon them. There cannot be a doubt that Intellectualism is correct in stating that the universe is bound to mean what observation, experiment, and concepts state. If things did not mean what long processes of attention and reflection state, well, the universe and life, in their manifestations, lead us astray. But it is impossible for us to conclude that the results of the senses, especially when they have been scrutinized and synthesized by mind, are after all mere illusions. The intellectualist is abundantly warranted in passing from the physical to the conceptual manifestation of things. But the intellectualist is not warranted in projecting his meanings and values *beyond* the universe and life. Such a process has no means of being tested. Speculative ideas with regard to what is beyond the universe and life, instead of illuminating the meaning of the universe and life, only tend to darken the meaning of things.

Just as the intellectualist's view tends to amplify the naturalistic view, the naturalistic view in its turn modifies the intellectualistic view. The two views, each an open system, tend to supplement each other.

The two previous views have emphasized, one, the

things and their relations, the other, the transformation of things and relations into concepts.

The *Voluntaristic* view deals with the aspect of mind which is termed *conation* or *will*. It deals, in the first place, with phenomena of life below man. It sees that on planes of life much below the human plane there is present in organisms a striving toward certain ends. Of some of these ends the creature is conscious (its hunger, for instance). Of other ends it is not conscious, especially in so far as no conceptual end is present. Yet many useful ends have been reached before the possibility of holding conceptual ends had yet appeared. This fact led several great thinkers to the conclusion that the nature of the universe and of life is best explained by positing a blind will which had been unconsciously striving until (probably) man was reached, when such a will became conscious of its own energy, and in its higher stages conscious of conceptual ends. This theory has no warrant to take its place as a complete explanation either of the universe or of life. The passage from a blind to a conscious will is merely stated as a speculative idea, and no proof of it has been produced. That a blind will should transmute itself into the highest possessions which are man's inheritance is a huge assumption.

But, on the other hand, it is doubtless true that the will plays an all-important part in life. There is an important sense in which it is present before the birth of concepts has taken place. The animal and

the child are able to reach certain goals for the preservation of their lives without a conceptual awareness of what they are doing. They have been endowed with organs which can be made to fit into certain moulds and they have profitably used this endowment.

It is also true that the conceptual life does not connote all the demands and possibilities of life. A cultivated individual may possess conceptual notions with regard to many things which the individual ought to be but is not. Something has to happen before we can become what intellectual conceptions state we should be. Many intellectual conceptions do not deal with what the individual should become, but many also do. Those that do, seem to be capable of becoming actual portions of the individual's personality. This means that some stirring or effort on the part of the individual should take place. A selection of things has to be made, some ground has to be travelled over, some goal has to be reached. The nature, meaning, and value of what all this is is shown in the concept, but a *deed* on the individual's part is absolutely requisite before he partially realises as a possession of his life what the concept states. There cannot be a doubt that such efforts are required if human personality is to benefit on all its sides. Possessing concepts is absolutely necessary, and these concepts should become more and more comprehensive, covering ever greater patches of the field of life. But it is so easy to deceive ourselves by

thinking that this constitutes the whole development of life. History shows (and perhaps the present day is no exception) great thinkers who were lamentably deficient in the possession of the concepts they had done so much to illuminate as actual ingredients of their own lives. They had brooded over some of the highest ideals of human life and existence, but there the matter ended. When they came into contact with the actual need of setting these great concepts in operation the need did not affect them at all; the high concepts vanished like the mirage of the desert when you come close to the spot where it seemed to be. That is the reason that often in simple-minded people, who are not conscious of anything extraordinary about themselves, one finds the *realisation* of the highest concepts of life revealing themselves with very great power—a fact which ought to sting the conscience and will of those who know more concerning the nature of things, but who are much greater in their knowing than in their *being* what they know.

Emotionalism, in the newer aspects of its developments does not give us a theory of the universe, but it has a good deal to state concerning life which is not without importance. Its physical aspect has an important place in Psychology, but it is its mental aspect and the influence of this upon the physical that is described in some of the newer works. Emotion or feeling need not be considered as one of three phases of consciousness. On the mental side feeling

may be looked upon as a vivid form of consciousness with regard to certain intellectual conceptions which are perceived as a need of one's nature or as a great value of life. Feeling (using the term on the mental side) thus means a kind of focussing of ideas by means of attention to them on the line of their satisfaction of a need or of their capacity in conferring some new benefit on life. Emotion (using the term on the neural side) deals with the changes which can be produced in the bodily organism in the presence of the uncongenial, the highly congenial, the unexpected, and the surprising.

On the two sides we are helped by emotion and feeling to be awake—more and more wide-awake. The material from the unconscious self is brought up to the conscious life, and gives a richness and depth and happiness to life unobtainable in any other way.

Somehow or other we have to try to unify the various aspects of the universe and life touched in this chapter if we are to possess partial but ever more comprehensive truths of the meaning, value and significance of things, and if we are to cultivate the various sides of our personality.

CHAPTER III

SOME PROBLEMS OF ORIGINS

We have now to enquire what are some of the main problems of science and philosophy with regard to the origin and becoming of the world and of life. It has already been shown that the naïve view of things is insufficient for their true interpretation. Reflection of mind working upon the impressions of the senses has often presented a view of things which is quite other than the view offered by the senses alone. Science and philosophy could not have originated had it not been that man was able to pass beyond the realm of sense to the realm of thought, carrying along with him to the realm of thought the impressions of the senses, verifying or correcting as the case may be the first impressions of sense. In the history of human thought we find the mind ever at work in this respect, often seeing old problems in new light, often modifying something erroneous which had crept in by means of superficial or false impressions as well as by trusting insufficient evidence and giving way to fanciful and imaginative ideas. Man has not been

satisfied, when his real interest in a problem has been aroused, to leave the explanation of the universe and of life just where he found it. He knows that things are not always what they seem. He takes a slab of nature or of life, or of both, into consideration; he observes and experiments and forms hypotheses, and he accepts what these are able to bring forth in connection with the problem under consideration. Scientific and philosophical thinkers are aware that something more can be said with regard to the nature of things than has been said before. These thinkers perceive that deeper views of things have become the inheritance of man, and they are convinced that the inheritance has not ceased, but can continue in the future as in the past. The meaning of the universe and of life is seen as not exhausted, and this conviction gives a new interest to the investigator. He sees that all things unfold their meaning only very gradually, and always under the pressure of the human mind attacking them from old and new points of view. The views of the universe and life already in existence cost much reflection and labour to those who brought them forth. We, the pupils of such thinkers, are able to understand what has been brought forth, and that is the first requisite for carrying such problems farther. It is not sufficient for anyone to see the problem with the eye of the observer, nor to be satisfied with what has already been said on the subject. As already stated, it is necessary to understand the conclusions arrived at by

others; it is also quite as necessary to be dissatisfied with what has now become self-evident and to try and see how far the problem will lend itself to a further handling. Our handling may be clumsy and one-sided at the start and for a long time, but it is quite clear from the history of the great investigators of the past that knowledge of what is must be coupled with the conviction that all has not been said on the subject. When this spirit is present the mind will become more alert; it will look for solutions in new directions; it will believe that new results can accrue. It is some form of endowment in this direction which brings creative potential powers into actuality, and which compels the material handled to yield some new secret.

There are, then, two calls in so far as the interpretation of all things is concerned. In the first place a thorough understanding of the work of others should form the first equipment for the further development of the problem. In the second place, when such an equipment is possessed the individual is ready to search for new points of attack.

The world as it is forms our object of understanding and attack. We shall take up a few very old problems to which the reflection of ages has been applied. First staring us in the face is the old but ever recurring problem of *Causality*. It has been already noticed that every thing in the world or in life does not entirely stand alone. It could not exist as it is but in some form of relation or under certain circum-

stances. We see that any thing is what it is on account of its own individuality united with certain conditions that help to keep the thing in existence. We become aware of this fact when we are often ignorant of the nature of these conditions. It may then be said that Causality is a fundamental concept of thought, and is necessary for an explanation of every object under investigation. How has such and such a thing come to be what it is now? What has operated upon it to enable it to be what it is? Such are questions which the reflective mind asks concerning all objects whenever it penetrates beneath the naïve view of things. Causality then consists in finding what factors have produced the results or the effects which we perceive in the object.

It is impossible for us to consider the factors which have helped to produce the results as the sole factors which have made the thing what it now is, simply because we leave out, by so doing, the *nature* of the object itself. The nature of the thing works upon the materials which influence it, and the material works upon the object itself. A reciprocal movement of this kind is ever taking place, and probably the tendency of causality is to come to mean as many of the factors as possible which bring into existence any object whether that object is physical or psychical. To go back and find some initial cause, which is supposed to be the " cause of causes " is not a method adopted by science and philosophy. We certainly do go back: we view as far as possible what objects

would be without certain factors which have operated upon them, but to state what is at the back of such factors is not (at present at least) the object of science and philosophy. What we require now is to find the factors which have had effect upon the nature of every object under investigation, to show the reciprocal effects of these upon the object, and the various modifications which have taken place on the two sides of external factors and of the nature of the individual object.

It has been already pointed out that science and philosophy are finding it increasingly difficult to deal in the same manner with objects of sense and objects of thought. That a connection between the two exists and has to be taken into account has also been touched upon. It is necessary for example to emphasize the material side of life. It is necessary, on the other hand, to place life in a category of its own, in spite of the fact that a great portion of life remains within a material category.

The matter stands somewhat as follows: Physical elements have an influence upon psychical and mental objects. Psychical and mental elements have an influence upon physical objects. As we are dealing in this volume mainly with the life of man, aspects of life below him, important as they are, have to be left out of consideration. The physical organism of man is affected by physical factors just as the animal's organism is affected. The mental side of man is also af-

fected by physical conditions, but none the less is it affected by mental conditions. Precisely as physical conditions play upon the object and modify its nature, so various social, mental, moral and religious influences play upon the life of man and modify it. One of the great lessons pointed out by social philosophy is this fact. And this fact is becoming more and more evident. But what is not quite so evident is another question, viz., whether man's whole nature is to remain passive in the midst of all the varied influences which pour upon it. The material which pours in upon human nature has to be sifted, some of it selected, some rejected. All this is a process of activity of mind and will. Man should not be a passive spectator in the midst of all this chaotic material. He has to search to know the causes — the vast number of forces which play upon his life. He has to understand what will happen if these forces are allowed to enter, and if no process of winnowing has taken place. And, on the other hand, he has to try and see what will happen when a process of sifting, selecting, and rejecting has taken place. We thus see that the individual obtains his material from the various kinds of worlds which surround him. All this is given him as an inheritance, but the evil is given with the good, the false with the true, the petty with the great, and the ugly with the beautiful. Even the plant rejects some of the elements which are injurious to it. It has actually evolved certain traps for these so that the cycle of its

life may be completed without the occurrence of untimely death.

Another problem which has engaged the mind of man from time immemorial is that of *Mechanism and Teleology*. We have here no space to enter into the agelong controversy with regard to the nature of the world and of man. Schools of thought have appeared again and again, especially in modern times, which have insisted that all things have had their origin in the various forms of matter and motion. It has been stated above that full justification should be given to the physical side of all things. But this means not quite the same as saying that there is nothing other than mechanism present, at least wherever life is found. The scientist is making an unwarrantable assumption when he states that life and mind and all they contain can be thus reduced. Philosophy, on the whole to-day, clings not only to the reality of external things but to the reality of the concept and all that it includes. It has a warrant for doing this even from the side of Biology. The recent advances of this science have made clear at least two important points with regard to life. In the first place, it has shown the closest possible connection of all forms of life with material elements in their bio-chemical forms. In the second place, Biology has emphasized the presence of the marvellous in the microcosm of the cell. The working of the cell, chemical through and through though it may be, is still a startling revelation of a working towards certain definite ends. It

cannot be stated that cells are conscious of such ends, but the *nature* of every living thing seems to possess a power which is not only equivalent but often superior to the thought of man. Life does contain wonderful things below the human level. We have to explain it not merely in the terms of the bio-chemical changes and tropisms that are at work but also in the terms of its ingenuity, exactness, and previsision. Teleology simply means this working towards ends, without emphasizing what is at work beyond the nature of the object itself. We are face to face with such a teleology in the universe at large and in the phenomena of life. It is nothing outside that does the work but the object itself. Thus, we are not dealing here with any kind of speculation, but with facts which point to the presence of a power (for which there is no philosophic name) below man which accomplishes marvels too great to understand from a purely mechanical standpoint.

When we reach man a teleology of consciousness is discerned. The actual evolution of human society and its changes are a proof of this. As will be pointed out in a later chapter man is able to frame and to hold before himself concepts higher and more comprehensive than any of the achievements of his life. He views such concepts as constituting the meaning of the universe and of life. One of the main messages of Philosophy to-day is to re-affirm the importance of this conceptual teleology— a teleology which leads man higher than where he stood

before although it does not reveal the meaning, value, and significance of life in its entirety. But enough is given to reach a summit, and when that summit is reached more still is possible.

In all this investigation the natural world, on the one hand, and the human mind, on the other, are at work. The two sides have to be emphasized. If they are not emphasized it is not possible to obtain a comprehensive truth with regard to the nature of the physical universe. And if the physical universe is left out of account in our view of things there is the grave danger of placing fancy and speculation in the place of truth. As already pointed out, the impressions of the physical world have to enter into mind, and be there transformed into concepts in a manner which is not in the least understood, but these concepts are interpretations and explanations of a world outside consciousness. The consequence is that we are obliged to take the objects of the external world in the way they behave amongst themselves, so that the conclusions of mind have to return continually to the facts of nature in order to increase the meaning and significance of the objects under investigation. This is really an aspect of the work of natural science more than of philosophy proper, and it is a very important work. The history of inventions and discoveries point out to us that these have not come into existence by mere fancy. They have had their origin in observation, experiment, and reflection. Thus, the workings of the

mind and the objects of the physical world are in the closest possible contact with each other.

But it is not correct to say that no truths can be made explicit without the constant presence of natural objects. Natural objects may have been present to the mind in the initial stages, and the mind had to work upon these and transform what it observed amongst these external objects into the form of *meaning*. But such objects cannot remain always by the side of the observer in a physical manner. They do remain with the observer in the form of memory and meaning. It can be seen at once what an enormous gain all this is. By its means we are able to bring the past into the present, and are able to be the possessors of a meaning infinitely more comprehensive than can happen at any particular moment or series of moments in our lives. Philosophy emphasizes this fact, and makes it clear that really a second kind of world grows within the consciousness and becomes an ever greater comprehension of the actual world in which we live.

The creations of the mind, helped doubtless by reflection upon the events of the external world, carry us beyond the physical world on the levels of mathematics, natural science, and the various branches of philosophy. Creations take place in mind of idealistic conceptions which pertain to all the natural and mental sciences. "The origin of these creations is a most interesting question for the psychologist and is buried in the mysterious depth of the mind. An

interesting account of it is given by Poincaré in a description of some of his own creations, to be found in his book, *Science et Méthode* (English Edition: *Science and Method).* His conclusion may be briefly stated thus: the mind is in a state of evolution of new ideas and new mental forms, somewhat continuously. Of those that come to the front some will have a certain relation of harmony and fitness for the problem at hand, which secures for them keen attention. They may turn out to be just what is wanted, sometimes they may turn out to be unfit, or even, contradictory. There seems little to add to this statement, for it pretty accurately describes what every reflective mathematician has observed in his own mental activity. A little emphasis may be laid, however, on the significance of the fact that sometimes the newborn notions are contradictory to the known theorems, because this fact shows conclusively that the mind is not impelled to its acts by a blind causality. In that case the new forms would have to be always consistent. This faculty is analogous to that possessed by the artist." (J. B. Shaw, *Philosophy of Mathematics*, p. 183).

As in mathematics, so in natural science. Knowledge is shown here to be possessed by means of observation, experiment, and reasoning. Enriques in his important book on *Problems of Science* shows us the work of the three in knowledge. It is certainly true as Whitehead points out that it is not sufficient for us to insist that it is the mind that knows ex-

ternal objects, that "no perplexity concerning the object can be solved by saying that there is a mind knowing it." (Whitehead: The concept of Nature). Whitehead is endeavouring to exhibit the types of relations which hold between the entities which we in fact perceive as in nature. We are told by him that this kind of knowledge is a necessary prolegomena for philosophy and for natural science. It is important to bear in mind this objective aspect of reality, and to conceive of the relations comprising events as actually existing in a world outside our conceptual knowledge. But it is also quite as necessary to be aware of the fact that this knowledge is a work of *mind*. Without mind it could not be obtained. "The general relations, taken by themselves, do not constitute mere sums of crude facts. There is in them an *abstraction from* or elimination of certain data. The scientific fact takes on the form of a *simplified fact, a type of a series of possible facts.* And the concrete prevision is accomplished by adding to the type the knowledge of certain *elements* considered as accidental, which distinguish and place a real fact in the series itself. Now this type takes the name of *concept*, and thus we may say that *scientific knowledge usually takes the form of concepts.*" (Enriques: *Problems of Science*, p. 81).

When we pass to the mental sciences proper, especially to logic and metaphysics, the nature and function of the concept—of the subjective side of knowledge—come markedly into the foreground. This is clearly

seen in the works of such prominent thinkers as Bradley and Croce. Bradley closes his *Appearance and Reality* as follows: "Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and, the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real." Croce in his *Logic* moves in a similar direction: "The appearance of the concept transfigures the representations upon which it arises, making them *other* than they formerly were; from being indiscriminate it makes them discriminate; from fantastic, logical. . . When from the variety of the multitude of representations . . . I pass on to enquire as to the truth of them all (that is to say, the reality which does not pass), and rise to the concept, those representations themselves must be revised in the light of the concept that has been attained, but no longer with the same eyes as formerly—they must not [merely] be *looked* at but henceforth thought. (*Logic*, pp. 149-150).

From this it is evident that attention has to be turned in two directions. The events of the external world have to be viewed with constant care, and be observed as existing and working outside ourselves. The meaning, value, and significance are brought forth by the work of the concept often upon physical material, and the truth concerning external things, as included in the concept, must be held fast, and brought back to the examination and interpretation of every further fact which presents itself to the mind. The two sides of things—the objective and

the subjective—run parallel together for a long way, and man has to cultivate both sides and remain loyal to both. It will be shown at a later stage that in the highest realms of the spirit of man the objective, physical side, in a large measure, disappears. But if it had not been operative on lower levels and if it had not made its contribution to the concept it is extremely doubtful whether any "highest realm of mind" would have any value at all. We are thus dependent upon the two sides. Both act reciprocally on each other and enable man to live in two worlds at the same time—the world of nature and the world of the concept.

CHAPTER IV

SOME PROBLEMS OF MIND

The subject of the previous chapter must now be carried farther. We have already touched on the fact that in knowledge objects are presented to the mind. The mind reasons upon the objects presented to it, and forms concepts concerning them. The objects in the external world continue to have their existence after the mind has formed its description and explanation of them. The conclusions which the mind has arrived at concerning such objects also remain as its possession in the forms of meaning, value, and significance. This possession comes only gradually into the mind, and it ought never to come to an end. The possession, in the form of concepts, gives an account of the actual occurrences of events in the external world as well as of the meaning and value of these events for the mind which perceives them. Such meaning and value is termed truth. Truth takes various forms. In its first stage it may mean but little more than an impression based upon casual

observation. This impression constitutes an *opinion* with regard to an object. We are not quite sure that the nature of the object is what we surmise it is. We go on farther with our investigation in the light of the opinion. We come at a later stage to a kind of *certitude* that the nature of the object under investigation is such and such. When we verify such a certitude further still we find that what is actually occurring in the object fits with our idea of it. So that finally we pass from a *belief* that a thing is so and so to a *knowledge* that it is so and so.

Truth takes various forms according to the nature of the object under investigation. Truth may be *empirical* when it deals with an examination of some object or objects in the external world, and when we wish to emphasize some aspect of the events which are happening in such object or objects in space and time. Truth takes an *immanent* form when we are dealing with a concept which exists for *mind*—for our own individual mind. We leave now out of account the fact of the existence of the object in a world outside ourselves. The object interests us for the time being as it exists in the mind. Truth also has a *transcendent* aspect. It forms, in the shape of concepts, a state of meaning and value which is beyond the individual. By "beyond" is meant here an idea which is more comprehensive than the actual life of the individual. The observer now sees various fragments of meaning focussing towards a centre and forming an idea or ideal which is more than can

be witnessed in any one object or in any one individual. In transcendent truth an idea has been created which constitutes a principle which applies to the behaviour of a number of objects — whether those objects are physical or mental. Truth may be termed *formal* when it deals with the various ways in which impressions and ideas come together, so as to constitute the instruments which have to be used in order to reach valid conclusions concerning the nature of any object under investigation. Formal truth informs us how we must proceed, what methods of attack are the best ones for making clearer the nature of the things examined.

We see in this way how many-sided the human personality that examines the world is, and how many-sided are the forms in which the nature of objects present themselves to us. All these sides have to be taken into consideration, for each one of them casts some ray of light on the object; and it is by such means that some corner of the world and of life is illumined for man.

Truth has grown by viewing portions of the universe and of life from different standpoints. The field of investigation is infinite, and man, at the most, is only able to view the field from one standpoint or a few standpoints. And each standpoint seems to present innumerable problems so that the material of investigation found in a very limited area of the field can never be exhausted. It is no wonder therefore that we possess such varied interpretations of the

universe and of life. We shall now turn to some of these interpretations.

One of the most prevalent standpoints of viewing things is that of *Empiricism*. The term has many different meanings in so far as it is an attempt to view all things in as *natural* a way as possible. In viewing objects in the external world the attention is directed by the empiricist to the objects themselves in their manifold relations. That the *mind* has much to do with such work is practically ignored from this standpoint. The concepts which are formed by man in viewing the world are looked upon by the empiricist as abstractions drawn from concrete experiences. " Experience " is viewed in very different ways by the different schools of empiricists. In the School which approaches the idealistic point of view experience is conceived as the sole source of knowledge, but no attempt is made to investigate what constitutes experience. When empiricism takes a *dogmatic* form it gives practically a quasi-material foundation to all knowledge. *Critical* empiricism is very near to the idealistic point of view in so far as it arrives at its results after an examination of the content of knowledge and its meaning and value. It may be said that such a critical empiricism is legitimate. It emphasizes the objective side of things in all its investigations; it does not create a gulf between natural and psychical objects. Probably greater emphasis will be laid by the Philosophy of the future upon the physical side of things and their behaviour outside

the reality of the concept although it is the concept which gives us the awareness of that behaviour as well as of its reality. The standpoint taken by Empiricism in its view of the universe and life is that of the object, and, in the main, the object as it lends itself to one or more of the senses. The object has problems enough for the time being at least without passing to the problem of the mind and its modes of knowing. To pass from one problem to another of a very different nature would confuse the issues, and the empiricist is abundantly right in recognising this fact. But he is entirely wrong when he ignores the fact that other pressing problems also exist—problems of the nature of mind itself, of the nature of the concept, and of the theory of knowledge.

It is on account of the recognition of other problems besides those of description of physical objects that the standpoint of *Idealism* in its various forms has taken a pre-eminent place in the whole history of Philosophy. Not only is the observer to view objects in the external world in their manifold relations; he has also to face as far as possible the still more difficult problems of the nature of *consciousness* in all its manifestations from simple awareness to the highest concepts which can be formed. Just as the centre of gravity in Empiricism had been placed in external objects in their various external relations so in Idealism (or Rationalism) the centre of gravity is placed in mind and its conclusions. We ask here, what do these objects in the external world in the manifold

relations mean to mind? Conclusions are formed concerning these, and these conclusions are conceptual and have to be conserved in memory and meaning for future use. What is found in the conclusions of mind and meaning is absolutely necessary for a progressive interpretation of things. Without the conservation of memory and meaning such progressive interpretation of the world and life would be absolutely impossible. These conclusions of memory and meaning form *universals* concerning the *particulars* which are presented to the senses and to the mind. In other words, a *conceptual* interpretation of things has been achieved, and is at hand to act as a *norm* or *standard* so that future particulars may find their meaning, value, and significance within it. The particulars resemble various threads in their isolation. The universal binds these together into a rope.

It is evident that the *conceptual* interpretation of physical objects is not a mere copy of these objects. The world of things and their relations cannot possibly mean the same as the world of meaning, value, and significance. Things and Thoughts are not the same. No philosopher would say to-day that an object in the external world is, in every respect, the same as our concept of that object. No amount of manipulation can convert the object into the concept or the concept into the object. The object and the mind with its concepts are both necessary for our knowledge of things. Perhaps the greatest inherit-

ance of a human being is the power to form concepts concerning the nature of objects, for it is by this means that the world becomes more and more intelligible to man.

The human mind passes through various stages in its relationship to objects. As already pointed out, before knowledge becomes possible subject and object have to be present to the senses and the mind. The world outside us is composed of innumerable objects, and these enter into brain and mind, in the first place, by means of one or more of the senses. Two radical and mysterious transformations take place *after* objects have entered. The various *physical* impressions of any object unite so that we are able to view the object as one whole object. Further than this, the various *mental* impressions unite in some similar manner so that we are able to *think* parts of objects together, as well as many objects in their relations. On the physical and the mental sides we are able to simplify and to clarify the objects which are presented; we are able to perceive and to think patches of objects and groups of simple ideas, and thus obtain views, descriptions, and explanations of ever larger pieces of the world. When such a procedure continues to grow on the physical and mental sides an ever more comprehensive view of the world becomes the possession of man. The meaning of the evolution of mind is that such *syntheses* should gain, from step to step, in comprehensiveness.

Philosophy, on the whole, lays emphasis on the

fact that the material for this development should proceed from the objects of various kinds which surround us in the physical world and in human society. There is a constant need of returning to this fact of objectivity—a fact which, though entire interpretation of it is impossible, is still a certitude.

Often the mind does not require the whole qualities of an object, and it is capable of *selecting* what it requires and of *rejecting* what is irrelevant to the purpose in hand. This process of *abstraction* has led to many important discoveries in the realms of nature and of mind. Thus *selective syntheses* are continually formed. A portion of the world is thus transformed, is placed in a new kind of setting which satisfies the demand of reason or imagination. The importance of this kind of work is seen in the realms of science, art, poetry, and religion.

We are thus led to the fact that the views of the universe and of life are very varied. It is extremely difficult to take all standpoints, but it is of fundamental importance that attempts should be made to pass from our customary standpoint to other points of view. For every standpoint contains some element of truth which we cannot neglect without some loss to personality. This is the main reason that there are many Schools of Philosophy, and that there is no complete unanimity amongst them. So many individuals in the past and the present have extracted so much meaning out of the universe and life that it has now become an exceedingly difficult task for any

single individual to occupy all these standpoints. But partial and temporary occupation of standpoints besides our own does enable the individual to see the objects from his own standpoint in a new light. For example, the empirical sciences have a message: they call us from our day-dreams and fancies to objects and their behaviour in an external world. The rational sciences of Mathematics and Logic emphasize creations of real and ideal concepts which illumine much of the darkness of the world and which reveal a conceptual world of beauty and glory. Psychology deals with the relations of body and mind, and with the psychical and mental processes which form the life of human beings—a life which starts at a level not far removed from that of the animal, but which mounts, step by step, to ever higher conceptual levels.

These chapters are written for the uninitiated in Philosophy, and have had to leave out of account some of the most important elements of mind, but I hope that enough has been said to show the all-important bearing of Philosophy on Life. How can we use efficiently the weapon of mind unless we know what it is and how it has become what it is as well as what it is still capable of becoming? Unless great problems of the universe and life press themselves upon the mind and rouse it into activity to obtain portion after portion of a solution there is not much hope of an abler generation in the future. And the sadness of the whole business is that this capacity, though present as a possibility in human nature,

comes to fruition only in the lives of a handful of people in all the civilised countries of the world. A great uneasiness is required at the present day within the mind itself with regard to its terrible inefficiency and even impotency to realise the possibilities that are imbedded within it. When such a "stirring of the waters" comes to be a new beginning becomes possible for the young generation. Such a new beginning will extract meaning, value, and significance from all the material it touches, and will unfold and realise untold possibilities which immensely heighten human personality and carry it upward to the borderland of the divine. Philosophy means (or ought to mean) no less than this. If so, it is the immediate business of all individuals who care for a fuller and deeper life to turn to its problems and to struggle with all their might for the solution of these problems.

In the main, we have dealt with the *theoretical* side of the subject. Philosophy has also its *practical* side. It is well for us to *know*. Many of the questions already dealt with are questions of *knowing*. We are turning now to the important question of becoming what we know.

CHAPTER V

PROBLEMS OF VALUES

In the previous chapters we have been dealing with objects that *exist*. Some of these objects exist in the *external world;* others are objects of *thought*. It has been sketched how we come to know these objects and what meaning we attach to them, but although the word *value* has often been used it has not been defined. We have not asked the question what *worth* or *value* objects have for us. Here we have to deal with the worth of various kinds of objects for man. Man is not merely a knowing being; he is as well a being with feelings and will. The natural scientist does not look upon man as the apex of creation. His object is to see from a physical point of view how man has come to be what he now is. When the natural scientist speaks of *evolution* he is not (unless he leaves his standpoint) speaking of a worse becoming a better—he only notifies the changes that have actually taken place in man's body.

Even the psychologist does not proceed much further. He deals with body and mind, but he deals with both from the point of view of making as clear

as possible the relations of body and mind as well as of showing all that he sees as happening in body and mind in their relations. Good and bad have no meaning for him from his psychological standpoint. He gains as much (and often more) from an examination of pathological cases as from an examination of normal minds. Certainly the psychologist does not deny a better and worse, a higher and lower, in the minds and bodies he examines. But " the higher and the lower," " the better and the worse " are not subjects of investigation by his psychological science.

In all the departments of life questions have to be asked concerning the comparative worths of things. It is not sufficient for us to remain satisfied with the results of the existence of objects and of their relations to one another. We have to pass beyond that question, and ask, what is the worth of these objects for the individual and for society?

We are here in the realms of *theory* and *practice*, and more in the realm of practice than of theory. We cannot answer the question, what the value of a thing is unless we possess an idea concerning the thing. We are obliged to *think* what is the worth of a thing for ourselves, or for others, or for both. But the idea has to be realised in a more complete way than was the case concerning a knowledge of objects as merely existing. Such objects which we conceive as merely existing exist without anything happening in us more than the idea that they do exist. But once

we begin to think of the *worth* of anything we are thinking of the *relation* of that thing as an object of satisfaction to a human being. The thing that exists can be brought into relationship with human life in one way or another.

The subjective conditions of human life are such as constitute very different needs. In all the needs there is a longing for satisfaction, but this longing may pertain to physical needs, to needs of reason, to the needs of the feelings, to the needs of the good life, and, finally, to the needs of religion.

In a word, there are, therefore, various types of values. In the first place there are *physical* values. These, in the form of food, clothing, shelter, and other bodily comforts constitute a satisfaction which the human body is capable of obtaining by means of certain physical objects which are brought into the required relation to the human body. A feeling of want is experienced by human beings in these respects. These wants require satisfaction from objects outside ourselves, and the *will* is set in operation so that such objects may be sought, procured, used, and enjoyed. When the objects then answer some particular need the need disappears and the objects are said to have value.

But values are not confined to the relation of sensible objects in the external world to some physical need of the body. They mean this, but they mean more. Man has (or ought to have) needs in other directions. The *reasoning* side of his nature has

needs. He finds that he is able to gather fragments of knowledge from what is in the world of nature, history, and society, and to weave these fragments into *wholes* more and more comprehensive. In this way, he is able to understand better and better some new aspect of what the universe and life mean for him. His life in this manner becomes richer; satisfaction is given to his mental powers, a desire to go still farther arises within the mind, and his whole personality undergoes gradual transformations. He now thinks that he is *more* through such knowledge than he was before the possession became his. Such knowledge comes then to have a worth or value for him. The feeling that some of his needs are obtaining satisfaction enables him to persevere farther on the same intellectual road and to cling with all his might to the intellectual values which have already entered. By such means he is now able to relegate several things, which prior to the quest occupied a primary place, to a secondary place. The ever increasing portions of the truths he has gathered into his mind act, when united, as a kind of judge concerning what particular thing should mean more, what should mean less, and what should be entirely rejected. In this manner he selects his world, and creates very often deep cleavages between objects. Some objects that previously meant much now mean little, others that previously meant little now come to mean much.

It is astonishing how the intellectual needs of men

can be satisfied more and more. They can never be completely satisfied simply because the objects which can be related to human needs never come to an end. The material is inexhaustible, and consequently his need for more correspondingly increases. Without such a possession which comes about through the relations of objects (physical and mental) to human needs no intellectual progress concerning the meaning and value of the universe and life could have taken place. And no progress, either on the intellectual or any other level, does actually occur save in so far as efforts are made to see that some things are better for us than other things and that a perpetual process of selecting, rejecting, and consolidating our possessions takes place. The individual in this way creates a second kind of world—a conceptual one—by the side of an undifferentiated physical world around him. If the question be asked, how far is the value of such a world dependent upon external objects on the one hand and on the individual himself on the other, the answer is that value receives its material from the external world, but the *judging* of such material depends upon the individual himself. We have already shown that values are related to the individual, and it is in this sense alone that they are termed relative. When we try to pass from "relative" to " absolute " values we are passing from certitude to inference, and ascribe absolute value to God as the " Ground " of the world and the Source of all values. But in all this it is the subject relating itself to the

object, working upon the object, and valuing it that enables us to do so. Thus we are back again in the region of relative values. But there is a sense in which values are objective in so far that they are or can be common to all, and in so far as many values consist not only in the connection of the individual in relation to its environment, but also in relation to other individuals. Thus values arise by means of this relation of individuals, and so constitute truths, feelings, and conations which are *over-individual* in their nature. This over-individual objectivity does not mean an objectivity in the sense that spatial objects are objective, but an objectivity which consists in complexes of thought and experience; and the very essence of such complexes is to be found in the actual relations of human beings to one another, and in their conjoint co-operation with regard to complexes of thought and experience which are the work of others who lived before us and which are now incarnated in institutions, writings, traditions, customs, etc.

In the life of individuals values may contradict one another—higher and lower levels are perceptible in every human life. The individual is able to bring these before a Standard. That Standard consists in the most comprehensive concepts which the individual possesses, and unless this Standard is taken into account we have no means of seeing what is lower and what is higher.

On the other hand, values further one another.

Lower, narrower ones often pass their contribution to the higher and more comprehensive ones.

When we turn to *aesthetic* values, we find that the *feelings* play an all-important part. There is here present a sense of oneness between the subject and its objects in the form of impressions produced in a form of immediacy and which often do not require to be translated into concepts. There is a pure sensuous enjoyment possible without the intervention of language and idea. But some amount of intellect and will seem to be requisite even to possess this enjoyment, so much at least as to keep the feelings from wandering away from the object. These kinds of values are of extreme importance in life. They form a relaxation from excessive toil on the side of the intellect and of the will, and produce a kind of equilibrium and rhythm in life. Moments like these are further of use in enabling the individual to re-start work which demands doing and which deals with an important side of man's nature. There is something akin to a very genuine kind of religion in such a state where man is brought into oneness with some piece of the universe which has been lifted up from all the rest of the universe.

But such a state of feeling cannot last for any great length of time if for no other reason than that we have to live again in relations with our fellow-men. Life is now seen as fragmentary in its relation to the ever greater completeness of the concepts which have been formed. The most pure concepts point out a

state of things which does not exist in the life of the individual outside the concept. The concept has gained in comprehensiveness. Starting from humble beginnings, with its object lying close to our hands, it has mounted to a new kind of world of meaning, value, and significance. It points out to us a world which ought to be and can be. When the individual contemplates such an ethical world of value, he longs to be what he ought to be and can be. The *content of the concept* is required at each step in the process in order to make clear to the individual the exact meaning of a possible state of existence which is above him.

The *will* has to be present at every step in the process because the content of the concept is seen to be not merely something to think about but something to *be*. Philosophy is thus theoretical in so far as it deals with the meaning and value of the nature of the concept; it is practical (or axiological) in so far as to insist that effort must take place in order to *realise* the *content* of the concept. The *theoretical* problems of Philosophy deal with our knowledge of what we ought to be; the theoretical problems require *valuation* and *decision* at every step in order that the goal of the most comprehensive concepts should be reached.

The will here means the mind active in its selection, rejection, and conservation of values. The starting-point of all Philosophy of Life lies in the concept of an absolute value or ought, and in the

acknowledgment of its realisation by means of deeds. Such deeds of the Will are really the carrying out of the highest concepts in all the relations of life. We thus see that Philosophy is in its highest aspect both theoretical and practical at the same time, and the old supposed opposition between the two does not exist. We also see that Philosophy deals with Life and its unfolding. It shows how it is possible by means of the union of thought and deed in all the relations of Life to pass from a world of sense to a *transcendental* world. Such a transcendental world is not any world in space, beyond the present world. It is in this world of ordinary life and matter of fact that the individual can create a second world of spirituality which in its value is far beyond all that is offered in the initial stages to the senses. It is to this world we are called, and Philosophy is the strong handmaiden that is able to lead us along the whole of this difficult path to a goal which we are absolutely certain is transcendental and spiritual. When such a goal is reached still higher possible goals are perceived in front of us and these in their turn are shown to be possible of realisation. Philosophy leaves, at this level, the whole *existential* aspect of things to the physical sciences and now asks after the *meaning* of all existential objects and events. The smaller existential values have now merged into the larger meaning and value of the highest and most comprehensive concepts which pertain to human life.

And this constitutes in the most real sense the spiritual evolution of life.

The business of *metaphysical* value is twofold. In the first place, metaphysics takes up the final concepts of natural science and enquires of their meaning and value in relation to the universe and life. In the second place, it takes up the final concepts of thought and action in their relation to life and enquires of the meaning of those in relation to man's life and destiny. Thus metaphysics constitutes a science of *principles* of the meaning, value, and significance of the widest and highest concepts in their relation to man and the universe. Such principles ever deepening and expanding in meaning—became norms and standards for all individual thought and activity.

When, finally, we turn to *religious* values we do not mean any kind whatever of new knowledge beyond what is revealed in the transcendental concepts as won by mind and will. But such transcendental thoughts and experiences are very far removed from the sensuous world and from the ordinary life of the day. The content, meaning, value, and significance of such concepts of thought, as realised in action, constitute a *spiritual world*. These are far enough beyond the world as to be designated *divine*. They constitute the culmination of values—a culmination which has been reached by the operation of *man's whole nature*. It is not the business of Philosophy to ask what lies beyond these in space and time. It

is sufficient for the individual who has experienced such values, and who continues to experience them more and more, to know that they constitute the highest evolution of the soul, and that space and time has now nothing more to do with them than to give a " night's lodging " to the individual's body which carries them through a material world. And we can close by saying that Philosophy warrants the postulate that such values have their origin and culmination in a Reality akin to themselves—a Reality in which all that was, and is, and is to be, live and move and have their being. To such a Reality we give the name of God.

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